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Make of Mere Worldviews: a Husserlian Approach to

Weltanschauung
Kenneth Knies 

kenneth_knies@hotmail.com
ABSTRACT

The problem of worldview is crucial to Husserl’s conception of phenomenology as an immanent critique of modern scientific rationality.
According to Husserl, our scientific traditions tend to frame the distinction between mere worldviews and the one true world in a way inimical
to the aims of science itself. It is thus an important task for the phenomenological critique of reason to rehabilitate this distinction. This paper outlines three ways to do it. The first two define world-directed
sciences in the customary sense (objective and critical-historical
sciences, respectively); the third defines phenomenology and opens up
the phenomenological view of the world.
Introduction
The problem of worldview [Weltanschauung] is crucial to Husserl’s conception of philosophy. Unlike his most influential successors, Husserl saw phenomenology as an immanent critique of modern scientific rationality that
would clarify and progressively realize its guiding ideal of universal knowledge.
In light of this ideal, Weltanschauung refers to a limited understanding of the
world, relative to the particular traditions of experience and praxis in which it
takes shape and functions. Phenomenology thus joins in the general scientific
effort to rise above ―mere‖ worldviews in order to discover the one true world.
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According to Husserl, however, our scientific traditions tend to frame the distinction between mere worldviews and the one true world in a way that detaches the latter from the sphere of intuition [Anschauung] available to the reflecting individual, whose life in the world inevitably develops a subject-relative
perspective. When framed in this way, the distinction results in speculation
and skepticism inimical to the aims of science itself. It is thus an important task
for the phenomenological critique of reason to rehabilitate the distinction between mere worldviews and the one true world. In what follows, I outline three
ways of framing this distinction. The first two define world-directed sciences in
the customary sense (objective and critical-historical sciences, respectively).
The third defines phenomenology and opens up the phenomenological view of
the world. The question of where and how this view of the world takes place,
and what it makes of mere worldviews, is best answered by approaching the
phenomenological reduction as a new way of seeing the lifeworld. In his 1911
Logos essay, Husserl outlined the task of a «rigorous philosophical worldscience» (HUA 25, p. 48).1 The following reflections incorporate later manuscripts and writings into a general account of phenomenology’s stance toward
this project.
1. An Initial View of the World
Wakeful life constantly enjoys a view of the world. Let us reflect on how this
view appears prior to any critical distinction between the one true world and
mere worldviews. When I look around, I am aware both of things and of my
particular view of them. Under normal conditions, the particularity of my view
does not speak against the reality of worldly being, but is rather my natural access to it. Those things I experience as most real are encountered in light of a
―can‖ and a ―could‖ that point to other possible views. The perceptual scene is
shiftable in definite ways relative to the movements I can accomplish, and
would appear otherwise if I were where that other person is. If I guess about
how things might be from these other perspectives, I explicate latencies already
inherent what I now see. My most immediate view on things unfolds in the
midst of other valid views, which I presume to be realizable either directly or
through communication. In the course of these realizations, I may privilege my
1

References to Husserl cite the Husserliana edition, as indicated by the abbreviation ―HUA‖ followed
by the volume number. Translations are my own.
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present perspective above those of others, or of my own past. But my present
perspective is itself defined by the conviction that it belongs to an open system
of compossible perspectives. Perception, our most direct encounter with
worldly realities, involves what Husserl calls horizon-consciousness. A core of
real presence is framed by the realizable presence that it indicates.
As we ordinarily use it in the singular, ―the world‖ expresses something allencompassing. If we search our naive experience for what answers to this
sense, we are thus directed away from particular realities. Every object, property, foreground, and background, every relation of indication between the
experienced and the experienceable is ―in‖ the world. On the other hand, we
cannot equate the world with the totality of realities and relations because while
such a totality may be hypothetically postulated, it is never experienced; everything we say to be in the world is rather encountered in an openness pointing
to further realities and revisions of established realities. But finally, the world
cannot simply be the spatiotemporal openness in which all realities and indications appear. It would then be incorrect to speak, as we naively do, of our seeing and touching it in particular perceptions. Reflecting on our naive experience of things, ―the world‖ seems to answer to an underlying conviction that
already frames our discovery of discrete realities. This is a belief in a unitary
togetherness or «universe» of compossible realities2, discoverable in an endless continuity of concordant perspectives, in which any and every thing has its
place. Thinking of those living in far away places, shifting our gaze from background to foreground, ruminating on the past and future history of our surroundings, we constantly traverse spatiotemporal horizons by means of our
belief in the one world onto which they open.
Because every particular appearance of the world is nested in other realizable appearances, there is always room for further world-determination. In our
unceasing commitment to the one world, we automatically privilege as normal
2

In the late Lebenswelt manuscripts collected in Husserliana 39, Husserl frequently describes the
world with the term «universe», often employed in the phrases «universe of determinable being» or
«universe of appearances». The term is felicitous because it evokes uniqueness and cohesion. It is
preferable to ―whole‖, which can be confused with totality, as well as ―context‖ and ―background‖,
both of which are confusable with sectors of the world. I agree with Bernet that characterizing the
world as ―horizon‖ is misleading. The world is given horizonally, as further determinable, but is itself
the unique unity of realities that is so given. Bernet’s own phrase, «order of things», also captures what
I take to be Husserl’s intent (Bernet, 2005, pp. 23–25). In any case, it bears emphasizing that worldhorizons function in the direct experience of the world, and are not world-images or pictures [Bilder].
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the determination that occurs in the harmonious overlapping or deepening of
perspectives. When incompatible views emerge within individual or communal
life, there is a tug to resolve them such that they are understandable in relation
to the one unity of realities in which we continue to believe. Of course, some
diverging views do not require resolution because they refer to familiar differences of interest or to forms of normality and abnormality that we already apprehend as typical features of the one world. Still, even cases of genuine disharmony [Unstimmigkeit] do not unseat the tacit belief in the one world of
concordant perspectives. They are interruptions of a previous harmony and
point toward its reinstatement. Further, these interruptions themselves appear
as occurrences within the one world, the determination of which has become
questionable only in certain details. Husserl thus describes Unstimmigkeit as
the interruption of a harmony that remains in effect (HUA 39, p. 676). On the
other hand, coherent views are restored in corrective experiences (memories,
perceptions, etc.) that are necessarily relative to a particular perspective, and
are thus themselves provisional (HUA 39, pp. 676–677). The world is the
presumed nexus of all relative views of the world, but is experienced as such
only in a relative view.
2. The Objective World and Its Subjective Appearance in Weltanschauung
According to Husserl’s historical interpretation, the primary reaction of Western philosophy to the relativity of world experience has been objectivism. In
sum, objectivism accepts world-determinations based on intuitive experience
as sufficient for ordinary purposes, but seeks the truth of this world by determining it with respect to a self-identical, stable reality:
The characteristic of objectivism is that it moves upon the ground of the world
that is pregiven as obvious through experience and seeks the ―objective truth‖
of this world, seeks what in this world is unconditionally valid for every rational
being, what is in itself. (HUA 6, p. 70)

For Husserl, objectivism in this broad sense encompasses most of philosophy
since Plato, including those idealist approaches that remain guided by the notion of a reality ―in itself‖ (even if only to conclude that reality is inaccessible or
an illusion). More decisive for our contemporary situation, however, is a specification of this objectivism motivated by the success of modern mathematical
physics. This «physicalistic» objectivism underlies essentially new philosophi-
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cal doctrines that «dominate all further developments of world-understanding
up to the present» (HUA 6, p. 54).
In one sense, physicalistic objectivism is this-worldly. It seeks objective being at the heart of our naive world-experience: sensibly intuited, spatiotemporal objects. It thus borrows its impulse from the implicit ontology of common
sense. In ordinary perception, value and use qualities are immediately present
in things. We are also familiar, however, with the constant variation of these
qualities according to interest, aptitude and attitude, both within ourselves and
within communal experience. Evaluative and practical apprehensions of things
and situations indicate, as a structural moment of their reference, sensible
qualities belonging to bodies in connection with their surrounding environment. Although these qualities also vary according to conditions of perception
and the sensibility of the perceiver, they make up a relatively stable core of
world-experience to which our everyday efforts of verification have recourse
(HUA 6, p. 108). Because physicalistic objectivism looks for true being in this
dimension of experience, it resonates with our ordinary interest in worlddetermination, in contrast to those «metaphysical» theories that retrain our
attention on some other ontological domain in which sensible realities participate.
On the other hand, this objectivism correlates sensible nature to its true being in such a way that the latter can never be directly experienced. In Crisis §9,
Husserl carefully examines this interpretation of true nature and the historical
motives that made it possible. His focal point is the mathematization of nature
that occurs in Galilean science. In this mathematization, Galileo is guided by
the tradition of pure geometry and its application to the sensible world.
Husserl’s crucial insight here is that although this continued application leads
us to apprehend sensible shapes ―as‖ geometrical entities, the latter are themselves strictly non-sensible, incapable of being perceived or imagined. It is precisely by not appearing in world-intuition that they can function as substrates
for properties reconstructable as exactly identical. Through a process of «idealization» that Husserl argues has never been rightly understood, original
geometrical thought posits its shapes by conceiving an infinite progression
toward the actually unreachable limits of ―perfect‖ shape-qualities, which it
then treats as positive determinations exhibited in sensible models. The basic
hypothesis of Galilean science is that all qualities and changes in sensible bodies are related in a lawful way to the extensional forms that underlie them, and
are thus mathematically determinable in idealized space-time. What does

44

Humana.Mente — Issue 18 — September 2011

Husserl object to in this remaking of nature? It is not the method of idealization as such. Nor is it the experimental methods that discover how typical patterns in perceived nature might correlate to mathematically exact qualities and
connections expressible in formulae. Nor is it the methods of measurement and
prediction that treat the exact determinations as optima to which perceivable
things are approximated. It is rather the interpretation of the success of these
methods that attributes to them the discovery of the one true world.3 For the
physicalistic interpretation, the world is a mathematically rational totality of
bodies, the lawful regularities of which are progressively discovered through
the inductive methods of natural science (HUA 6, pp. 61, 66). These methods
thus take on a kind of ontological prestige. Their predicative power in the
sphere of possible experience is seen to stem from their going beyond possible
experience to discover the world as it really is. The one world to which our experience commits us is finally determined apart from its perspectival manifestation in pre-scientific life.
As a matter of historical judgment, Husserl argues that physicalist objectivism emerges by establishing an ontological distinction between the real world
of mathematically rational bodies and the mere appearances of subjectivity.
What is new here in comparison with pre-modern forms of objectivism is that
experience as such, in all its forms, is inserted in a reality of which it can have
no direct intuition. This results, as Husserl writes in a late manuscript, in «a
complete dislocation of meaning that nullifies the being-sense of the world and
its realities» (HUA 39, p. 731). The open horizons of naive world-experience,
in which reality is ever further determinable, are now seen to afford mere appearances, indications of what exists in-itself according to exact properties in a
space-time that transcends possible experience. One may question to what
extent this ontological interpretation still governs the philosophical understanding of physics and the everyday judgments of educated individuals. For
Husserl, it was in any case decisive in determining the problematic for the major philosophical movements of the modern period through Kant. I would ar3

We here overlook Husserl’s analysis of the increasing arithmetization, algebraization and formalization of the mathematics underlying natural science. This process encourages the objectivist interpretation by distancing physical formulae from their grounds in pure intuitions pertaining to the spatial
phase of material being. The deduction of possible formulae on the basis of given formulae creates the
appearance that the experimental confirmation of the former is an incidental discovery of a truth itself
independent of world-experience.
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gue, however, that the most important target of Husserl’s critique is not the
ontology of a mathematically rational in-itself behind the scenes, but the basic
attitude toward world-experience from which it arises, and which is also compatible, for instance, with a pragmatic account of natural scientific truth.
This attitude is characterized by its devaluation of naive world-experience
as a problem for scientific investigation. It is supported by the seemingly obvious dependence of the experientially given world on the natural world (HUA 6,
p. 61). One assumes that experience happens in a human or animal, a psychophysical being in the physical world. Experience thus occurs within the nature
investigated by the natural sciences. One is free to abstract from this total reality in order to study ―first-personal‖ world-appearances, but this is precisely to
refrain from considering the connections that actually obtain between experience and its physical conditions. The modern science of experience is thus
from the beginning understood as a specialized inquiry overshadowed by the
problem of its connection to the mathematically interpreted nature that encompasses it. Even where experience is investigated apart from its physiological ground or an analogically constructed causal nexus, the overriding attitude
is that the goal of lawful explanation requires transcending world-appearances
toward objectively measurable regularities pertaining to them. Husserl’s basic
critique of modern experimental psychology is that its scientific interest does
not actually terminate in lived experience. In directing its efforts toward fixing
regularities pertaining to experiences, it is content to make use of «crude concepts» (perception, other person, etc.) taken from our non-scientific talk about
the world (HUA 25, p. 18). Husserl’s problem is not experimentation per se,
but rather that modern psychology has largely neglected the more fundamental
task of grounding those concepts describing subjectively relative worldappearances in laws inherent to lived experience itself.
A similar point underlies Husserl’s critique of natural-scientific inquiry in
Crisis §34. Objective natural-scientific truths are only verifiable through experimentation that constantly makes use of world-intuitions. Scientists communicate, read instruments, etc. Husserl makes two observations here. First,
these intuitions are made use of according to the meaning they have for us in
naïve experience, not according to their objective-scientific interpretation.
Communication between colleagues exhibits dissenting or assenting opinions.
Vision of the instrument shows the reading as it itself is. Although objective
science can apply its methods to these phenomena as well, it is always in their
pre-scientific meaning that they function in the scientific judgments. Second,

46

Humana.Mente — Issue 18 — September 2011

the specific function of these pre-scientific evidences in objective-scientific
judgment is that of a grounding premise. The validity of experienced worldly
realities is actually the premise for every objective-scientific conclusion. The
evidences of communication and normal vision, for instance, are presupposed
in order to draw conclusions about the mathematical properties of physical
nature. The ―mere‖ world-appearances undergird the objective truths.
This critique is trivialized if reduced to the claim that objective science cannot tolerate a hyperbolic doubt directed at the world the objective truths of
which it seeks to determine. If one is prepared to deny the evidence that we
constantly make use of in everyday life in the world, then clearly the objective
truths about this world are also falsified. If one believes in this evidence, then
the truths of objective science obtain. Belief in the world of appearances as the
setting of subjective life is naturally the basis for a scientific interest in determining the truths pertaining to it. But Husserl’s aim is not to raise doubts
about the obvious evidence that functions in objective-scientific judgment (e.g.
that my colleague is now speaking his mind). It is rather to show that the orientation of objective science prevents it from developing a scientific interest in
world-experience in its original modes of validity and meaning, and that it thus
makes use of it naively, as simply available. The proper ground of objective
science is indeed the world that appears in experience, but the objectivist impulse to go beyond this ground precludes its scientific appropriation in universally valid judgments.
3. My Surrounding World and the Historical Lifeworld
In our initial description, we defined the one world as the correlate of an endless concordance of realizable perspectives. We did not pay attention, however, to how this endlessness is ordinarily centered on familiar surroundings
relevant to the established interests of everyday life. In this familiar world
[Umwelt], things and others are immediately understood in terms of the typical
contexts of praxis in which they are involved. Everything has a name by which it
can be readily pointed out for others, and its meaning is explicable in terms of
other established meanings. Against this assumed background of coherent realities, one knows how to proceed in order to resolve anomalies, and is free to
focus on what is interesting or urgent. In reflection, we can recognize the Umwelt as an inner-worldly accomplishment of practical life, built up through the
habitual direction of interest to particular things, ends and values in communi-
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cation with particular others. But for everyday praxis, the possibilities of communication with remote others in remote surroundings are blankly «irrelevant»
(HUA 15, p. 431). One lives toward what Husserl calls the «inner-horizon» of
the Umwelt, which is indefinitely open, but which bears the unknown within
the generally familiar (HUA 15, p. 219). In numerous writings of the 1920s
and 1930s, Husserl considers how the Umwelt gets distinguished from the
lifeworld [Lebenswelt], the one true world of historical intersubjectivity.
Husserl consistently privileges the encounter with the foreign as the experience in which Umwelt is distinguished from Lebenswelt. We can capture
the scope of his analyses by schematizing the foreign into three Umwelthorizons suppressed by the movement of everyday life into the inner-horizon:
the depth, marginal, and outer horizons of the Umwelt (each of which is plastic
and defines community at various levels). The depth horizon bears historical
experience the recall of which as a past present is irrelevant to our everyday
world-life. The marginal horizon bears abnormal experience that contributes to
this life, but in a problematic way (child, drunken, deranged experiences, etc.).
The outer horizon bears alien experience that does not directly contribute to
this life because it is wrapped up in its own Umwelt, with its own depths, margins and outside. In everyday life, the foreign appears in a domesticated guise
because the Umwelt can contain well-known, constantly verified facts pertaining to the depth, marginal and outer dimensions.4 Indeed, everyday praxis often reckons with these facts as relevant. There was no television in the 19th
century; the blind cannot see; the Iraqis live in a warzone. Such facts are familiar features of Umwelt reality.
Every such fact, however, refers to a foreign perspective that is itself not in
the depths, margin, or outside, but is the life for which another Umwelt unfolds, another everydayness and urgency where things cohere according to
different meanings and activities. Facts about the foreign that lie in the inner
horizon of the Umwelt thus indicate the possibility of pursuing encounters with
the foreign perspectives to which they refer. To actualize this possibility, the
interests that define what is relevant in ―serious‖ everyday life have to be temporarily set aside, a suspension requiring the combination of levity and atten4

Husserl often abstracts from the foreign in order to examine the possibility of its original discovery
on the basis of a familiar world that historically or structurally precedes it. For the distinction between
historical and structural precedence, and the parallel in the latter case between the home/alien problematic and the analysis of empathy in the Cartesian Meditations, see Held, 2005, pp. 39–40.
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tion characteristic of curiosity. The encounter with foreign perspectives occurs
in empathetic experiences that cannot be harmoniously fulfilled because they
intend persons as subjects of a foreign surrounding world that is valid in its
own interwoven meanings (HUA 15, p. 433). Since this foreign validity is
emptily intended, one enters a situation where one does not know how to proceed in order to resolve Unstimmigkeit. Empathy, through which I intend the
other as such, thus opens into a hermeneutics of understanding at a distance.5
But this distance is necessarily also a connection by which the possibilities of
the remote world reach into our own, the very obviousness of which now becomes strange. This movement can be a momentary flight of fancy, but it can
also spur a disciplined inquiry aimed at critical historical-cultural understanding of our serious everyday life.
Everyone knows that our Umwelt is one among others. But the critical historical attitude stays close to the realization pointed to by this triviality: what we
ordinarily take for the one world is merely a coherent context for a tradition of
practical life. Our Umwelt as such, with exactly these depths, margins and outsides, emerges in its contingent particularity and can be evaluated as a historical product. In this awakening, Husserl sees an original discovery of «history»
or «culture» as related to a particular community (HUA 15, p. 216). By stepping back from the Umwelt into historical connections and contrasts that normally go unnoticed, critical understanding brings worldviews in the customary
sense to explicit awareness. Our ways of making sense of things on the basis of
everyday experience are revealed in their utility and narrowness, as products of
our belonging to traditions of practical life (HUA 25, p. 50). Even in going
beyond ―mere worldviews‖, this attitude remains cognizant of a universal historical relativity, and interprets its world-knowledge as the expression of
broadened Umwelt horizons, not as their transcendence (HUA 25, p. 52). After all, the exploration of depths, margins and outsides has an inalienable starting point in the everyday life of our Umwelt. The one Lebenswelt shines
through in the estrangement that reveals this life as a contingent but unshakable perspective on the whole of historical experience. But it cannot be directly
grasped in terms of the native conceptualities from which we inevitably begin.
5

Steinbock’s study strongly emphasizes the «transgression» that reveals the inaccessibility of the alien
and the non-reciprocal hermeneutics that follow from it. Steinbock (1995, pp. 257-270) eventually
likens phenomenology itself to such a hermeneutic. The final section of this article should indicate our
disagreement with such a characterization.
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It is instead intended as the telos of an infinite inquiry that would discover ever
more encompassing continuities and contrasts in which our local realities have
their true place.
In his 1911 Logos essay, Husserl argues, with reference to Dilthey, that
this formation of historical consciousness becomes a motive for historicism, a
relativist position that, if consistent, restricts the validity of all knowledge to
the historical-cultural worldview in which it functions. Perhaps Husserl’s best
known position on the topic of Weltanschauung is his demonstration of the
absurdities involved in inferring the impossibility of universal worldknowledge from the fact of historically relative worldviews. It is equally important to note, however, that Husserl acknowledges the historical relativity of
world-knowledge as a fact. Indeed, this fact is rooted in the nature of worldly
reality itself. Husserl writes in a late manuscript that truths asserted about
worldly realities are «final» only relative to governing interests or factual constraints; they are never final in themselves (HUA 39, p. 707). And correlatively: «the world of being is nothing outside of this relativity» (HUA 39, p.
726). If we abstain from objectivist constructions and justify knowledge claims
solely with reference to the Lebenswelt, the world we intuitively experience, it
seems that the assertion of universal truth is necessarily the premature closure
of an infinite process of historical discovery. However basic the features proposed as universal to the Lebenswelt, such as space, time, subjects and objects,
it is impossible to accord any definite content to these conceptions beyond an
Umwelt in which their meaning is relative to a particular tradition of practical
life.6 Identifying common ground within the world of experience is legitimate
as a practical goal for cross-traditional understanding, not as a theoretical goal
for universal science.7 The interest in the one true world that arises from the
historical attitude has immense critical power. It even seems to dissolve physicalist objectivism into an interpretive episode in the vast plot of human history.
But it, no less than the Galilean orientation, points away from a philosophically
rigorous world science.
6

Carr (1987) implies that phenomenological world-science aims at a «neutral» world lying «underneath» the various conceptual schemes that passively inform our world-experience (pp. 215–219).
We will argue that this is not the case.
7
In the Crisis, Husserl argues that the effort to identify this ground is already «on the way» to objective
science (HUA 6, p. 139). One surpasses relativities by positing universally identifiable qualities,
devising ways of measuring them, etc. This project is consummated only through objectifying measurements that take non-experiencable qualities as optima.
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4. The Lifeworld Taken for Granted and Seen in the ―How‖ of its Relativity
The world that embraces objective science is subjective-relative through and
through. Critical historical understanding achieves clarity within this relativity
by making us aware of our place within the vast reaches of possible experience.
Husserl himself acknowledges this relativity as a fact, and employs critical historical analysis in order to grasp the scientific situation of our time. And yet, he
sees these critical analyses as preliminary to a science composed of universal
insights into the essence of the Lebenswelt as such. If this science does not
penetrate the depth, marginal, and outside horizons of our world, and if it is
not the notorious ―view from nowhere‖, then where do its reflections occur,
and what do they reflect upon?
In the Crisis, Husserl presents this science as concerned with worldly realities in their very subjective relativity. It is the structures of this relativity itself
that will become the subject-matter for universally valid judgments (HUA 6, p.
142). Ordinarily, our relative views are our natural access to worldly realities.
Our interest is in determining things on the basis of our views. When we reflect on these views, it is in order to decide what they are views of. Husserl introduces the phenomenological reduction by shifting our attention away from
objects onto the inherently relative ways in which they are given in experience.
The target of reflection is no longer, for instance, the perceived object, but
rather the sides or aspects that actually appear and that, in the anticipated continuation of their harmonious unfolding, exhibit one self-same object. In shifting attention from various kinds of objects and validity-modes to the ―how‖ of
their appearance, one becomes attuned to the ever-presence of an intentionality that animates presenting appearances with a sense that unifies them, namely
the object that appears as it appears in its unfolding aspects. Presenting appearances thus bear an objective sense that betrays a subjective life of meaning.
The primary insight into the essence of the lifeworld is not that it contains this
or that sort of reality, but that all of its realities lie in intentional experiences
that synthesize manifold appearances. Though Husserl recognizes an ontological task in the eidetic description of lifeworld entities, this task is a mere
guide for the reflection on the structures of intentional life in which all such
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entities exist. This latter reflection reveals the essence of the lifeworld as such,
and is identical with phenomenology.8
We have said that the subject-relativity of worldly being is a fact. As a fact, it
is established in certain world-directed experiences in which relativities are
revealed: spatial perception, memory, empathy, imagination, etc. When we live
through and reflect upon these experiences we ordinarily take them to be
events in the world. But phenomenological reflection holds fast to the realization that it is in these experiences that the world is originally there in its native
relativity. This is the case not only for encounters at the fringes of the Umwelt.
It is already the case for the perception in which I see this ordinary thing from
my particular perspective, for the empathetic apprehension of this body as belonging to a person with her own view, for the memory in which the past present appears as such. In their original functioning, these experiencing are not
facts in the world, but are the transcendental life through which the world
counts as being there in its subject-relative modes of validity (qua far off, for
the others, past, etc.). Experience is originally a movement of world-showing
or discovering. If we completely shut down our interest in worlddetermination, we cease reflecting on experiences as events in an already discovered world, and are free to reflect on them in their world-discovering function. There is thus a stark difference between synthetically identifying lifeworld
realities by researching the relative views of various traditions, and reflecting
on the structure of the experiences in which these views are originally given as
relative to time, place, community, etc. The depth, marginal, and outer horizons, in which the discovery and synthesis of relativity occurs, require a transcendental clarification of their possibility. In the phenomenological science of
the Lebenswelt, theoretical interest does not curiously traverse worldhorizons, but reflects on the experiencing in which they are first of all given as
traversable.
It is this naive life of world-showing that methods of essential insight will attempt to articulate into «an immense system of novel and highly astounding a
priori truths» (HUA 6, p. 169). These truths are ramified with respect to categories and modes of entities, but first of all in terms of the general divisions
pertaining to experiencing as such. Husserl describes these integral moments
8

Landgrebe (1968, p. 156) states the situation clearly: «The philosophical fundamental science of the
lifeworld is thus nothing other than the carried out transcendental phenomenology itself, with its task
of discerning the world-constituting accomplishments of transcendental subjectivity…».
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of intentional life according to the threefold Cartesian model of cogitatumcogito-ego: the objectivity as intended, the subjective appearances in which it
is intended, and the subject that performs the intention. Husserl’s presentation
of this threefold in the Crisis explicitly reverses the order of discovery he employed in Ideas I, where the ego of intentional life is discovered prior to the
reflection on cogitata qua cogitata. In the Crisis, Husserl begins with the correlation between that which appears and the subjective appearances in which it
appears, only then discovering the intentional life latent in this correlation and
finally the ego to which it refers. But this new approach is a pedagogical strategy for avoiding basic misunderstandings of phenomenological doctrine, not a
new doctrine. The problem with the old approach, Husserl says, is that it presents the ego of intentional life as «apparently empty of content», such that it is
hard to see how phenomenological subject-matter is crucial to the aims of universal science (HUA 6, p. 158). By moving backwards from worldly realities,
one is constantly aware that the reduction is the way of access to «the absolute
sphere of being in which they ultimately and truly are» (HUA 6, p. 193). The
reduction is the method that lets the true world appear to reflection.
Still, even if I first discover the transcendental ego as the source and bearer
of worldly validities, I am nevertheless free to question the status of its intentional life vis-à-vis the world it discloses. One can see Husserl’s infamous
Weltvernichtung in §49 of Ideas I as an attempt to answer this question. While
Husserl does not repeat this exercise in the Crisis, it is perhaps the most forceful way to illustrate phenomenology’s comprehensive view of the lifeworld beyond its stepwise illumination of world-intuitions. Husserl argues that reflection on the nature of intentional life shows that it does not essentially depend
upon the world of appearances, and correlatively, that I cannot derive an appearing world from the essence of this life as such (HUA 3, pp. 103–104).9 In
short, a life of consciousness is conceivable in the absence of a world. In the
context of the critical-historical aims of the Crisis, this reflection decisively
distinguishes phenomenology’s worldview not only from the objectivist construction of a world beyond experience, but also from Kantian-style approaches for which the world of experience is a formation of «concealed transcendental functions» that operate «with unwavering necessity» (HUA 6, p.
9

Husserl’s Weltvernichtung stays within the framework of intentionality, indeed of intuition. For a
brief treatment true to this point, see Sokolowski, 1974, pp. 196–197. For a dissenting view, see
Bernet, 2005, pp. 21–23.
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120). The intentional nature of consciousness does not rule out the pure possibility of an experiencing for which appearances do not cohere into an order of
realities, a world. The discovering transposition of the world into a phenomenon for my transcendental life thus includes the realization that this life, according to what makes it essentially life and what makes it essentially mine,
neither requires nor necessitates the world it displays.
What does this imply for the possibility of rigorous philosophical worldscience? The world has no conditions of possibility beyond the flow of transcendental life in which it concretely appears. This life is the only proper object
for a science aiming at the ultimate grounds of worldly being. Philosophically
rigorous world-science cannot secure the being of the one world that our experience continuously motivates us to presuppose. It rather discovers the truth
of this world by explicating the structures in which it appears as a contingent
revelation to conscious life. This contingent revelation is appreciated as such
in the attitude of wonder. Husserl’s much-maligned Weltvernichtung has the
virtue of making clear that every essential necessity about regions of worldlybeing is an articulation of the essential contingency of the world itself. For
phenomenology, the primary deficiency of all ―mere worldviews‖ is not their
narrowness compared to the open horizons of history, nor their naïveté compared to the experimental findings of objective science, but rather their insensitivity to the wonder of the pre-given world, which they take for granted in
pursuit of more interesting or relevant problems. But what problem is more
interesting or relevant than our original contact with the world, the myriad
forms of which we sum up with the expression ―life‖? Phenomenological interest treats each episode of world-disclosing life as an event that requires understanding and faithful expression if I am to know what the world truly is.
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